Kunapipi
Volume 34

Issue 1

Article 5

2012

An awkward silence: Reflections on theory and Africa
Ashley Harris

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi
Part of the Arts and Humanities Commons

Recommended Citation
Harris, Ashley, An awkward silence: Reflections on theory and Africa, Kunapipi, 34(1), 2012.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi/vol34/iss1/5

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

An awkward silence: Reflections on theory and Africa
Abstract
From Edward Said’s early investigation into the politics of how theory travels (1983), to Obioma
Nnaemeka’s warning that ‘theory-making should not be a unidirectional enterprise — always emanating
from a specific location and applicable to every location’ (362), postcolonial scholarship has always been
wary of the circuits that prescribe theory making in a global economy of knowledge. Yet, postcolonial
theory has not succeeded in avoiding the trap of articulating itself across these same circuits of
knowledge production, particularly when it comes to reading the texts and signs of the continent of
Africa. The tools of postcolonial studies’ theoretical repertoire have, for the most part, been forged in the
academic centres of the West, only encountering African cultural and aesthetic texts via the methodology
of application.

This journal article is available in Kunapipi: https://ro.uow.edu.au/kunapipi/vol34/iss1/5

28

Ashleigh Harris

An Awkward Silence: Reflections
on Theory and Africa
From Edward Said’s early investigation into the politics of how theory travels
(1983), to Obioma Nnaemeka’s warning that ‘theory-making should not be
a unidirectional enterprise — always emanating from a specific location and
applicable to every location’ (362), postcolonial scholarship has always been wary
of the circuits that prescribe theory making in a global economy of knowledge.
Yet, postcolonial theory has not succeeded in avoiding the trap of articulating
itself across these same circuits of knowledge production, particularly when
it comes to reading the texts and signs of the continent of Africa. The tools of
postcolonial studies’ theoretical repertoire have, for the most part, been forged in
the academic centres of the West, only encountering African cultural and aesthetic
texts via the methodology of application. This reiteration of the appropriation
of African cultural and aesthetic objects into a Western frame of interpretation
has, I argue, never resolved the Subaltern Studies group’s early concern with
the problem of intellectual appropriation of the subaltern voice. Instead, theory
formation, both in and outside of Africa, has failed to escape this ‘unidirectional
enterprise’. As Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall proclaim, this has occurred
through the conception of African knowledge production as autochthonous,
which re-inscribes African knowledge and theory as unique to the geographical
borders of the continent, thereby existing outside of the circuits of global
knowledge production (Mbembe & Nuttall 348). The essay traces the ways in
which both postcolonial studies and theory making in Africa, in their focus on the
political imperative to give voice to African selves, have become complicit in this
theoretical patterning.
After establishing the problem of this pattern of theory formation and use,
the essay considers various investigations into the ethics of letting the other ‘be’,
as opposed to demanding (even in the interests of scholarly ‘hospitality’) that
he/she give an account of him/herself. The true hospitality of learning how to
hear and understand African knowledge and theory production (in both the West
and in Africa) involves, I argue, a hearing that must, of necessity, unsettle the
interrogator. Not because the theory production of Africa is inherently unsettling
or different to theory from elsewhere, but because entering the unsettling and
ethical space of listening, in philosopher Luce Irigaray’s sense, means suspending
the belief that as postcolonial scholars we ‘know’ the places that our scholarship
engages. Such an acknowledgement is the crucial first step in accepting that
reading and understanding across vastly different and infinitely complex
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cultural, geographical, linguistic and epistemic spaces will always involve
misunderstanding and misinterpretation. It also suggests that there is no authentic
African theory that will convey the massive sign ‘Africa’ to the world. African
theories will, themselves, not fully know Africa.
In deemphasising the question of voice and concomitantly emphasising the
ethics of silence (both in being silent to hear the voice of the other and in letting
the other’s chosen silence be), this essay posits a methodology for theorising in
and on Africa that focuses on the suspension of the scholar’s claims to expertise
and knowledge. In the ‘awkward silence’ that ensues, I argue, we might find our
way through the dilemma of maintaining the political importance of location in
how we circulate and consolidate bodies of theory whilst simultaneously refusing
an autochthonous location of knowledge in African locations.
Theory on/in Africa
At a recent symposium held in Helsinki,1 Harish Trivedi made an impassioned plea
to ‘Western scholars’ to stop patronising the rich literary traditions in postcolonial
nations by spending their time applying trite theoretical concepts wrought in an
Anglophone, Western academic global circuit, to texts written (in English) by the
postcolonial darlings of the Western academy. The flattening collocation ‘Western
scholars’ notwithstanding, Trivedi’s point, more elegantly outlined in ‘Translating
Culture vs. Cultural Translation’, warrants reflection: as a global discipline,
postcolonial scholarship is in danger of becoming narcissistically self-producing,
a loop that, Trivedi argues, actively silences languages, cultural expressions and
aesthetics that are not directed towards a Western, Anglophone audience. One
may add that the term ‘global’, when applied to academic disciplines is itself
a rhetorical sleight-of-hand, since the provenance and providence of those
disciplines remains firmly located in Anglophone universities. These disciplines
— for our purpose ‘postcolonial studies’ — travel, of course, but their travels
follow the logic of export, which is to say that they ‘arrive’ in other parts of the
globe as already solid disciplinary objects, pre-organised by the contexts that they
have been exported from and resistant to reshaping.
I sympathise with Trivedi’s frustration at the ways these so-called global
knowledge economies overproduce the value of Anglophone writing2 and
writers who posit themselves as ‘cultural translators’ operating for a Western
(Anglophone) audience. The issue gets to the heart of the impasse that the
discipline of postcolonial studies has found itself at for many years: is it possible
to articulate a trans-historical, trans-cultural postcolonial theory? If so, how
can the critical tools we take from such a theoretical repertoire be used to read
aesthetic and cultural texts from postcolonial contexts without reproducing a
colonial hierarchy of knowledge?
This is not a new question in postcolonial studies, of course: indeed, as Said
warned us, as early as 1983, postcolonial theory (indeed, all cultural theory):
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… can quite easily become cultural dogma. Appropriated to schools or institutions,
they quickly acquire the status of authority within the cultural group, guild, or
affiliative family. Though of course they are to be distinguished from grosser forms
of cultural dogma like racism and nationalism, they are insidious in that their original
provenance — their history of adversarial, oppositional derivation — dulls the critical
consciousness, convincing it that a once insurgent theory is still insurgent, lively,
responsive to history. (Said 179)

The perniciousness of this pattern is nowhere more keenly felt than in the ways
in which Gayatri Spivak’s nuanced and detailed critique in ‘Can the Subaltern
Speak?’ has been canonised. The essay is often reduced to the term ‘subaltern
silence’, which once simulacrally detached from Spivak’s argument, travels
freely. Our frustration with the glib way in which the phrase is often used is
redoubled if we return to Spivak’s essay and recall her adamant resistance to such
recuperations of her own methodology into an imperial logic. With the specific
intention to articulate the insurgent position of Subaltern Studies as an intellectual
method, Spivak notes the epistemic violence inherent in the making and use of
first-world theory (74). She writes that the work of Subaltern Studies must provide
‘a radical textual practice of differences’ that does not simply reiterate ‘the selfdiagnosed transparency of the first-world radical intellectual’ (80). Critiquing
Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault’s post-representational theories, she further
notes:
The unrecognized contradiction within a position that valorizes the concrete experience
of the oppressed, while being so uncritical about the historical role of the intellectual, is
maintained by a verbal slippage. Thus Deleuze makes this remarkable pronouncement:
‘A theory is like a box of tools. Nothing to do with the signifier’. (Spivak 69–70)

It leaves us somewhat despondent to see Spivak’s essay reduced to the simulacral
catchphrase, ‘subaltern speech’, and placed in just such a theoretical toolbox,3
thereby losing ‘its insurgent, lively, responsiveness to history’ (Said 179).
Without rehearsing the multiple ongoing debates regarding the epistemic
violence of such first-world (Spivak) or Western (Trivedi) analysis, as a starting
point this essay accepts the proposition that the tools of interpretation and criticism
that constitute postcolonial studies have by and large circumvented African modes
of intellectual and theoretical production. That is to say, at the very same time as
African studies is vastly represented across the Anglophone academy, we might,
along with Achille Mbembe and Sarah Nuttall, note the ‘overwhelming neglect
of how the meanings of Africanness are made’ (350). This neglect, born I would
argue out of an all-too-easy application of theoretical commonplaces to an entire
continent, leads to ‘dominant imaginings of Africa’, and ‘routine readings and
deciphering of African spaces’ (Mbembe & Nuttal 352).
These rote readings of Africa, produced by a methodology in which the
continent and its cultural production are ingested into a theoretical model
produced ‘elsewhere’, do not emerge because there is no theory formation in
Africa itself but because such readings fail to engage African theory as theory.
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This is not to say that African spaces and cultural and aesthetic objects can only
be interpreted through theories produced in Africa, of course. Indeed, Mbembe
and Nuttall’s insistence that ‘all knowledge is contingent on other knowledges’
and, as such, ‘we must read Africa in the same terms we read everywhere else’
(351) is a premise in this argument, though with one significant revision: I argue
that ‘the terms’ that we use to read everywhere else need interrogation and must
themselves enter into a conversation with theorising from, and theory in, Africa.
Nnaemeka addresses one aspect of this dynamic by suggesting that theory
formation should inhabit a ‘third-space’ in Africa that calibrates global (mondial)
knowledge to and with indigenous knowledge archives (Nnaemeka 376–78). It is
worth clarifying what Nnaemeka means by ‘third-space’. She writes:
My choice of space over place or location in mapping what I call the third space is
informed by the distinction Achille Mbembe makes between place and territory in his
essay on boundaries, territoriality, and sovereignty in Africa. (377)

For Mbembe,
A place … is an instantaneous configuration of positions. It implies a stability [sic.].
As for a territory, it is fundamentally an intersection of moving bodies. It is defined
essentially by the set of movements that take place within it. Seen in this way, it is a set
of possibilities that historically situated actors constantly resist or realize.
(qtd in Nnaemeka 377)

Following these theorists’ thinking, I take the African continent to exist ‘only
as a function of circulation and circuits’ (Mbembe & Nuttall 351) and, as such,
analysable only by way of tracing and understanding those circulations and
circuits. This thinking makes it all the more important for us to interrogate the
‘uni-directional’ character of much postcolonial scholarship on Africa, since
that uni-directional (and hence imperial) flow is actively forming the continent’s
imaginary in the academies of the world.4
Postcolonial studies and the structure of scholarly address
The problem of the voice of the subaltern other has dominated postcolonial
studies from the early work of the Subaltern Studies group onwards. This concern
has developed as a rich tradition of postcolonial inquiry, driven by the ethical
and political imperative to dismantle the imperial discursive structures (including
those embedded in academic inquiry itself) that silence the subaltern. This
imperative clearly follows Spivak’s initial injunction that we focus on what the
subaltern cannot say. Yet, irrespective of the nationality, race, gender or class of
the scholar, his/her position vis-à-vis the subaltern is a priori one of discursive
power: the scholar has the capacity to speak for or on behalf of the subaltern. The
danger inherent in the scholar’s appropriation of the subaltern voice is described
by Spivak herself, while more recent scholars have reasserted the importance
of the political and ethical impulse behind the urge to advocate on behalf of the
voiceless (see, for example, Sanders 2002; 2007 and Attridge 2004; 2005). Yet we
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can decipher a common structure of address in both of these positions: irrespective
of whether the scholar appropriates or advocates on behalf of the subaltern voice,
what remains is the structure of the encounter, which I would like to describe as
one of hospitality.
The scholar, at home in the academic discourses when he/she is discussing
texts that engage the predicament of the subaltern, is — we must agree with Spivak
— at a significant discursive remove from the subaltern herself. Yet the gesture
to recover the voice of the subaltern, and without which the subaltern remains
doomed to silence, is certainly a generous one; it is a gesture of hospitality, of
making space in the discursive home, for the foreigner (here, he/she who is absent
to the discourse). The gesture of hospitality as structuring a form of address is
usefully elaborated via Jacques Derrida’s Of Hospitality where he reminds us that
despite the fact that the foreigner is ‘warmly welcomed … given asylum, [and]
has the right to hospitality’ (Derrida 11) that ‘foreigner is first of all foreign to
the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is formulated’ (15). Thus, the
foreigner ‘has to ask for hospitality in a language which by definition is not his
own, the one imposed on him by the master of the house, the host, the king, the
lord, the authorities, the nation, the State, the father, etc.’ (Derrida 15). We might
add ‘the scholar’ to Derrida’s list, bringing new meaning to his observation that
the host ‘imposes on [the foreigner] translation into [his] own language, and that’s
the first act of violence’ (15). For Derrida, this violence is ‘where the question of
hospitality begins’ (15).
To put this in the idiom of postcolonial studies, we might say that the hospitable
gesture towards the voicing of the subaltern is simultaneously a form of epistemic
violence in which the subaltern’s voice must be articulated in the registers of
the academy (and in the languages of the dominant culture, to recall Trivedi’s
concerns above: this is, after all, also a literal translation). Homi Bhabha tries to
address this matter by positing what he terms ‘a vernacular cosmopolitanism’:
Bear in mind, of course, that the ‘vernacular’ shares an etymological root with the
‘domestic’ but adds to it — like the ‘‘Un’ that turns heimlich into unheimlich — the
process and indeed the performance of translation, the desire to make a dialect: to
vernacularize is to ‘dialectize’ as a process; it is not simply to be in a dialogic relation
with the native or the domestic, but it is to be on the border, in between, introducing
the global-cosmopolitan ‘action at a distance’ into the very grounds — now displaced
— of the domestic. (Bhabha 48) 5

It is interesting to note that Bhabha emphasises the language of ‘home’ and the
‘uncanny/un-homely’ (in Freud’s sense), thereby highlighting the subversive
quality of the vernacular that calls the domestic itself into question. Bhabha not
only engages the complexities and complicities of this host/foreigner dynamic,
but does so in ways that have sought actively to destabilise the very authority
of the host-scholar. To return to Derrida’s articulation, we are reminded that the
foreigner contests the authority of the host (Derrida 5) at the self-same moment
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he/she must respond to the host’s initial question, ‘Who are you?’ in a language
not his/her own.
What we see in Bhabha’s analysis is a shift in critical focus from the voice
of the subaltern other to the language scholars use to negotiate the ethics and
politics of representing the subaltern. That is, the foreigner’s initial challenge to
the authority of the host is prioritised, rather than the foreigner’s right to speech
in the home of his/her host. This becomes particularly pertinent when we take
the theoretical language of scholarly analysis as our object of inquiry, rather than
the cultural or aesthetic texts that those analyses interpret. I would like to make a
similar move, suggesting that when it comes to the question of theory on/in Africa,
we might do well to question the discursive claims to authority that theory, produced
in circuits that have distinctly circumvented Africa, claim over the sign ‘Africa’.
An African Account of the Self
For Judith Butler, the question (‘Who are you?’) addressed to the stranger (to
be read in our discussion as that person who is other to the discursive home
of cultural theory) demands that the other give an account of him/herself. For
Butler the call to the other to give an account of him/herself produces (over and
above the symbolic violence pointed out by Derrida) an ethical violence, ‘which
demands that we manifest and maintain self-identity at all times and require that
others do the same’ (Butler 2005 42). Such coherence in our account of ourselves
is impossible for two key reasons. First, as Butler points out:
If I try to give an account of myself, if I try to make myself recognizable and
understandable, then I might begin with a narrative account of my life, but this narrative
will be disoriented by what is not mine… The narrative authority of the ‘I’ must give
way to the perspective and temporality of a set of norms that contest the singularity of
my story. (Butler 2001 26)

The first limit to a coherent account of myself (in any context) then, is that the
norms and language (let us say the symbolic codes) by which I represent myself
do not belong to me and do not match my experience of myself. Secondly, the history
of the body that houses this ‘self’ ‘… is not fully narratable. To be a body is, in some
sense, to be deprived of having a full recollection of one’s life’ (Butler 2005 38).
Now, when the body in question is the African body, discursively written into
the thick layers of trauma sedimented by the histories of slavery, colonisation
and apartheid, this ethical violence redoubles; becoming political as well as
ethical. This is not to say that the host-scholar intends to assert this violence on
the African object of his/her analysis. Indeed, one possible reason as to why it
remains so difficult to shift these entrenched discursive positions is precisely
because the host-scholar is, in the act of ‘doing postcolonial theory’ most often
driven by the good faith to restore the voice of the African as a human voice. That
is to say, as Derrida reminds us, the foreigner to whom we address the question
‘Who are you?’ ‘… is not simply the absolute other, the barbarian, the savage
absolutely excluded and heterogenous’ (21). The good faith of the host lies in
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his/her curiosity to know the foreigner as man or woman, not as savage. The
good faith of the scholar-as-host in postcolonial scholarship has been, further, to
invite the narrative of the African subject as an act of historical repair. This takes
the form of an appeal to the African to write him/herself over the vacant scar left
in discourse by the long histories of slavery, colonisation and apartheid, all of
which perpetuated, to some extent, the non-humanity of the African other. In its
restoration of African subjectivity to the realm of the human (yet still foreign)
from the realm of the non-human (barbarian), postcolonial theory might, indeed,
be considered to have been a resounding success.
Indeed, one might say that it is all the more important that the African give
an account of him/herself as ‘self-same and coherent’ precisely because any
incoherence or inconsistency in the narrative of the African self is in danger of
being recuperated into racist paradigms of thought that constantly seek to attach
terms like dishonesty, irrationality, stupidity to the African subject. The African
subject (as guest in the house of theory) must self-present as the rational, coherent
human par excellence.
It is not only theory from an ‘elsewhere’ that has called African subjectivity to
account in this way. As Mbembe points out in ‘African Modes of Self-Writing’,
the ‘effort to determine the conditions under which the African subject could
attain full selfhood, become self-conscious, and be answerable to no one else’
(2002 240) can be seen to follow two forms of thinking in Africa, both of which
fall into the same logic as I have described above. According to Mbembe, the first,
‘Afro-radicalism’, is trapped in a polemic relationship with those three historical
moments considered constitutive of African subjectivity: slavery, colonisation
and apartheid. That is to say, as a theory of African subjectivity it ‘contradicts and
refutes Western definitions of Africa and Africans by pointing out the falsehoods
and bad faith they presuppose’ (244). Furthermore, it:
[disqualifies] the West’s fictional representations of Africa and [refutes] its claim to
have a monopoly on the expression of the human in general [as a way] to open up a
space in which Africans can finally narrate their own fables. This is supposed to be
accomplished through the acquisition of a language and a voice that cannot be imitated
because they are, in some sense, authentically Africa’s own. (Mbembe 2002 244)

Mbembe’s analysis is that it is under this ‘guise of “speaking in one’s own voice”
[that] the figure of the “native” is reiterated’ (245). This introduces the second
form of African thinking critiqued by Mbembe: what he calls the ‘prose of
nativism’ (Mbembe 2002, 252). It emerges out of the ‘reconquest of the power to
narrate one’s own story — and therefore identity — [that seems] to be necessarily
constitutive of any subjectivity’ (255) and it establishes ‘a quasi-equivalence …
between race and geography’ (256).
Both African modes of self-writing, however, articulate themselves against,
but tragically reproduce, the racist logic of the Enlightenment. Mbembe writes:
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According to [the] darker side of the Enlightenment, Africans developed unique
conceptions of society, of the world, and of the good that they did not share with
other peoples. It so happened that these conceptions in no way manifested the power
of invention and universality peculiar to reason. Nor did Africans’ representations,
lives, works, languages, or actions — including death — obey any rule or law whose
meanings they could, on their own authority, conceive or justify. Because of this radical
difference, it was deemed legitimate to exclude them, both de facto and de jure, from
the sphere of full and complete human citizenship: they had nothing to contribute to
the work of the universal. (2002 246)

Against the epistemic constraints of Enlightenment thinking, and against the
determining histories of slavery, colonisation and apartheid, Africans strive
‘to know themselves, to recapture their destiny (sovereignty), and to belong to
themselves in the world (autonomy)’ (242). Yet, the voice claimed reiterates
Africa’s isolation from the circuits and networks of modernity, since it is one
that must reiterate authentic African discourses and authentic African identity, as
a narrative of the African — and through metonymic slippage, Africa — as selfsame (to return us to Butler’s words).
The refusal of these discourses to speak themselves in the language of the
Western Enlightenment thus fails and capitulates to those very discourses it
seeks to refute. Are these narratives of the self not, after all, still trying to prove
the humanity of the African? The Western scholar prompting (or demanding)
the speech of the postcolonial other through his/her analysis of that other is not
dissimilar to the African seeking unique and authentic articulation of his/herself.
Both resist the idea that:
Africa as such exists only on the basis of the text that constructs it as the Other’s
fiction. This text is then accorded a structuring power, to the point that a self that
claims to speak with its own, authentic voice always runs the risk of being condemned
to express itself in a pre-established discourse that masks its own, censures it, or forces
it to imitate. (Mbembe 2002 257)

To escape this discursive trap, the African might then refuse to speak altogether,
but that brings us back to the problem of the subaltern who cannot speak. What
is the prognosis, then, in light of this epistemic and representational impasse, for
African modes of self-expression, theory and theorising?
The strategy taken by Mbembe and Nuttall in answering this question is ‘to
constitute an argument that relies less on difference — or even originality — than
on a fundamental connection to an elsewhere’ (Mbembe & Nuttall 351). It is
worth citing Mbembe and Nuttall’s stance on this matter in some detail:
Though the work of difference has performed important functions in the scholarly
practice that sought to undercut imperial paradigms, it is clearly time, in the case
of Africa, to revisit the frontiers of commonality and the potential of sameness-asworldliness. This is a far cry from a proposition that would aim at rehabilitating facile
assumptions about universality and particularity. After all, the unity of the world is
nothing but its diversity. As Jean-Luc Nancy argues, ‘the world is a multiplicity of
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worlds, and its unity is the mutual sharing and exposition of all its worlds — within
this world.’ As for the ‘sharing of the world,’ it is, fundamentally, the ‘law of the
world.’ (Mbembe & Nuttall 351)

Following this logic for our own purposes, we could say that what Nancy’s
insistence that ‘… there is no other meaning than the meaning of circulation’
(Nancy 3) suggests that the question of theory in/on Africa is not a question for
Africa alone. Instead, the question should be levelled at scholars everywhere, as
Nancy’s statement, ‘…this circulation goes in all directions at once’ (Nancy 3)
suggests. More radically, Africa is not a question only for scholars of/in Africa.
It is a question for all scholarship, no matter its subject. It is to this notion of
‘sharing the world’ that I now turn in an attempt to describe an ethics that may
give us critical leverage in the impasse I have outlined above.
Towards an Awkward Silence
If we return to one precise moment in Spivak’s ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, we
find a small tear in the fabric of the text that opens a possibility for an ethical
account of ‘sharing the world’. Discussing Pierre Macherey’s ‘formula for the
interpretation of ideology’, Spivak quotes him thus:
What is important in a work is what it does not say. This is not the same as the careless
notation ‘what it refuses to say’, although that would in itself be interesting: a method
might be built on it, with the task of measuring silences, whether acknowledged or
unacknowledged. But rather this, what the work cannot say is important, because there
the elaboration of the utterance is carried out, in a sort of journey to silence.
(Macherey 1978 87 qtd in Spivak 81–82)

Spivak’s analysis, as we well know, focuses ultimately on Macherey’s second
interpretation of silence (what the text cannot say). Yet just as Macherey himself
gestures towards the possibility of a new methodology, approaching the matter of
what the text refuses to say, so too does Spivak comment (briefly) on what this
work might involve:
Although the notion ‘what it refuses to say’ might be careless for a literary work,
something like a collective ideological refusal can be diagnosed for the codifying
legal practice of imperialism… The archival, historiographic, disciplinary-critical and,
inevitably, interventionist work involved here is indeed a task of ‘measuring silences’.
(Spivak 82)

This aporia, skipped quickly over in Spivak’s and Macherey’s texts (because
of a greater political imperative), indeed opens up a valuable methodological
alternative, one that seeks to measure the silences imposed by the (hospitable)
request (on behalf of, we could argue, postcolonial theory itself), that the other
provide an account of him/herself in the language of the scholar.
On one level, this is precisely the issue Nnaemeka is addressing when she
suggests that African theory must modulate its use of theories from elsewhere
with the specific cultural terrain of its own spaces. But we might push the matter
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further still and suggest that what the African account of the self refuses to say
may be read not as a measurement of silence (isn’t this, after all, much the same
as grappling with what the text cannot say or getting caught in the polemic of the
Enlightenment that Mbembe warns us to steer clear of), but rather in letting that
silence be.
In its most obvious form, letting the chosen silence of the other ‘be’ would
resist the urge to impose a full and coherent account of subjectivity on African
modes of self-writing. Yet surely we cannot afford to let the African self ‘be’,
returned to a silence that reinforces the violence of slavery, colonisation and
apartheid? In a world in which the circulation of meaning and theory making
is not multidirectional we still need a scholarly methodology that will continue
to motivate the desire to know about the African experience of history whilst
simultaneously acknowledging that that knowledge will never be complete.
In Sharing the World, Luce Irigaray interrogates the meanings and values
of silence, as a way of forging a new ethics of ‘sharing the world’. Her theory
starts with the observation that ‘possession, subjection, [and] appropriation’
have dominated ‘monosubjective culture’ (Irigaray 4; 2). Thus, for Irigaray,
monosubjective culture assumes that the subjectivity of the other is reducible
to mine (1). For Irigaray, as for Butler, to reconfigure ethically the relationship
with the other requires me to acknowledge that I too am not the self-same. In
‘[r]ecognizing one’s own limits, as well as the [fact that the] existence of the
other [is] irreducible to one’s own existence’ are the first steps towards finding a
‘substitute for appropriation’ (Irigaray 2).
It is in silence itself that Irigaray posits this new ethics of relationality. She writes:
… silence will no longer be that which has not yet come to language, that which is
still lacking words or a sort of ineffability that does not merit interest in language.
Silence is the speaking of the threshold. If this silence does not remain present and
active, the whole of discourse loses its most important function: communicating and
not merely transmitting information. Then dialogue becomes possible. In no dialogue
can everything be said, and it is recognizing the necessity of something unspeakable
and its preservation that allows an exchange of words between two different subjects.
(Irigaray 5)

Irigaray offers us an account of what the text or narrative of the other might
refuse to say, without this being reduced to what it cannot say. Silence is, thus,
not negatively defined (as the failure of language and communication). Irigaray
writes, ‘[relations] between two different subjectivities cannot be set up starting
from a shared common meaning, but rather from silence, which each one agrees
to respect in order to let the other be’ (Irigaray 5).
Irigaray’s theory offers us a new approach to the scene of hospitality and
its foundational violence of asking the foreigner to account for himself in the
language of the host. Irigaray describes the scene of hospitality thus:
We offer to the other that which we unconsciously reserve for ourselves: an enclosed
space partly defined around a void… We offer to the other a part of this enclosed
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and, in some way, empty, territory — a sort of prison cell, in fact like our own. To be
sure, the other will be sheltered, but in an enclosed space, a place already defined by
our norms, our rules, our lacks and our voices. The other will have the possibility of
dwelling only in a loop of the interlacing of relations where we ourselves are situated
by our culture, our language, our surroundings. (Irigaray 23–24)

Thus, as host, ‘… we hardly reach the threshold … we call to the other … we
invite him, or her, to share our home, without yet leaving a well-known place in
order to approach a region that is familiar to us’ (Irigaray 7).6 For Irigaray then,
true hospitality does not reside in offering space within one’s home for the guest,
but in coming to the threshold of the home and meeting the foreigner in a space
that is mutually unsettling. Therefore, each subjectivity:
has before it a source of words foreign to that in which it dwells —thus not a space
opened up by language that is already shared, but a horizon which [sic] opens beyond
its limits. (Irigaray 6)

Instead of the structure of address that demands that the foreigner account for
himself before the law of the host, this new ethical ideal recommends meeting the
other in a threshold place, where the positions of foreigner and host fall away, and
in which we allow the silence of the other to ‘be’ (or, in my own phrasing, we allow
the other to refuse to account for himself). This is a space that recalls Nnaemeka’s
‘third space’ and Bhabha’s ‘border space’ cited above. For Irigaray, this space is
not equivalent to an impossibility of discourse between the two subjects. Rather,
she posits a ‘double listening’ between the two strangers, meeting on the threshold,
which ‘can prepare the beginnings of a common dwelling’ (Irigaray 14).
This ‘double listening’ is a kind of ‘reciprocal abandon’ (6) of our own
positioning within discourse (that is, a coming to the unsettling threshold of our
home). The encounter should be a reciprocal opening towards the unknown and
the strange, rather than a reduction of the other into a nameable object, subject to
the law of my home.7
Given that I have suggested that the scene of hospitality might be a useful
metaphor to understand the problems with theory in its application to the vast
continental sign of Africa and its people, what, then, might this reconfiguration
of the scene of hospitality bring to the question of postcolonial theory? Instead of
suggesting that the non-African scholar must simply avoid writing about African
subjects and texts because this is the authentic domain, of the African scholar,
I would like to reiterate (following Irigaray, Attridge and Sanders) the ethical
importance of the curiosity to hear the voice of the other. Yet, if we configure
scholarly writing on/in Africa (as we should with all other spaces), as an act of
coming to a threshold, as a scholar, I must, indeed, am obliged to admit my nonknowledge, rather than to perform a complete knowledge of what is posited as a
knowable other. Ethics can provide us with a guiding principle in our scholarly
pursuits: it requires us to suspend our claims to expertise and knowledge, and
to resist the call to the other to give a full and coherent account of himself. It
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further requires us to self-reflect critically on our own knowledge paradigms; by
entering into the awkward spaces of ‘not knowing’ we may call into question our
knowledge of the world and the tools with which we construct that knowledge.
The awkward silences that ensue might prompt real dialogue, respecting both what
the other refuses to say and being challenged by entering into the discourse of the
foreigner and in listening (albeit partially, incompletely) to what he/she is saying.
This means that knowledge production comes to be a sharing of the world,
not in the sense that the world we share is the same (it is not, it can never be),
but in the sense that the circuits that create meaning become multidirectional,
allowing for participation from all locations and respecting the misunderstandings
and confusions that must ensue. If such a dialogue were to structure the address
of academic work, we might see a way out of the theoretical impasse we find
ourselves in when it comes to ‘theory’ and ‘Africa’. That is to say, theories
would circulate through and from Africa, but would make no claim to being
autochthonous. Africa would become woven into multidirectional theory-making
processes in ways that would be self-evident. At present, this is not the case: the
knowledge production industry has by-and-large amputated the entire continent.
We think nothing, for example, of an application of Derridean theory to African
writing, but using, say, Mbembe’s theory to read a novel by a white American
male author would require much more complex motivation. African ‘theory’ in
this view of scholarship is only valuable insofar as it contributes to the account
of the African self.
In this sense, I would argue, that irrespective of its registers or scope, theory
written in Africa or by Africans today is not considered to be theory. This is a
profound epistemic and ethical violence that structures contemporary global
understandings of knowledge. It also continues the historical violence of slavery,
colonisation and apartheid and traps the work we do as scholars in those deeply
divisive structures. When any demand is made, specifically of the African, that
he/she account for him/herself that demand is historically prescribed in the
discourses that make that account a plea for being heard ‘as human’. The idea
that this act of questioning became one of hospitality, of assuming the humanity
of the African, has allowed complacency to enter academic discourse because the
act of hospitality is seen as adequate reparation for these violent pasts. Thus, the
postcolonial scholar exempts her/himself from shouldering the responsibilities of
the slave, colonial and apartheid past, thereby reiterating Deleuze’s view, which
displeases Spivak so, that theory ‘has nothing to do with the signifier’.
What is required is a profound act of self-reflection by the ‘global’ academy
as to how its practices re-inscribe the violence’s (symbolic, epistemic, ethical)
of those histories that remain constitutive of Africa in the global imaginary. This
requires that we open a threshold, in Irigaray’s sense, that is deeply self-reflexive
and, thus, unsettling. On that threshold we must enter into the awkward silence
that may enable a new ethics of theory on/in Africa.
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Notes
1

2
3

4

5

6
7

‘Words and Worlds: Transculturalism, Translation, Identity’, Nordic Network for
Literary Transculturation Studies. Helsinki, Finland. 26–28th August 2011.
See also Harish Trivedi, ‘Ngugi wa Thiong’o in conversation’.
Achille Mbembe’s insistence that it is premature to speak of Postcolonial theory,
precisely because a sustained and thorough theoretical project has never been
consolidated in postcolonial studies, with the result that we have, perhaps, only such
a disparate toolbox of critical tools at our disposal in the field, is pertinent. He writes,
it is ‘an exaggeration to call it a “theory”. It derives both from anti-colonial and antiimperialist struggles on the one hand, and from the heritage of Western philosophy and
of the disciplines that constitute the European humanities on the other. It’s a fragmented
way of thinking…’ (Mbembe 2008, 1).
In their ground-breaking Essays in Migratory Aesthetics: Cultural Practices
Between Aesthetics and Art-making, Sam Durrant and Catherine M. Lord challenge
methodologies that implicitly reproduce such uni-directional flows of knowledge. The
essays collected in their book are exemplary in their redirection of these global flows.
Pertinent to my essay is Durrant’s own lucid analysis of Chinua Achebe’s Things
Fall Apart as itself part of a broader global tradition of literary modernism, which reorients the ways we might have traditionally approached Achebe’s perceived realism.
Graham Huggan’s ‘Unsettled Settlers: Postcolonialism, Travelling Theory and the New
Migrant Aesthetics’ also uses such critical methods to call ‘into question the ease with
which the experience of migration is accommodated within poststructuralist vocabularies’
and considers ‘the way in which diverse experiences of migration are homogenized by
“travelling” cultural theories’ (17). These concerns bear close similarities to my own. There
is a great deal more fruitful work to be done in the area of African theory and migratory
aesthetics, but it is, unfortunately, beyond the immediate scope of my discussion.
It is worth refracting Bhabha’s comments through the prism of Derrida’s later reflections
on hospitality and cosmopolitanism (see Jacques Derrida On Cosmopolitanism and
Forgiveness), but I do not have the space to do it here.
Irigaray’s prose is notoriously awkward, this being her own translation from the French.
Derek Attridge makes a similar point in The Singularity of Literature where he suggests
that the reader’s encounter with a literary work creates the ‘possibility not of a new
structure of knowledge but of a powerful and repeatable event of mental and emotional
restructuring’ (Attridge 2004, 27). Attridge’s argument, though staging many of the ethical
steps I am outlining here, hinges on the literariness of the text created in what he calls
the ‘event’ of reading. Thus, while his argument impacts the question of methodology, it
does so through the lens of the literary, rather than the theoretical, encounter.
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